Liberal and Illiberal Peace-building in East Timor and Papua : Establishing Order in a Democratising State by Smith, Claire Q.
This is a repository copy of Liberal and Illiberal Peace-building in East Timor and Papua : 
Establishing Order in a Democratising State.




Smith, Claire Q. orcid.org/0000-0002-7479-4312 (2020) Liberal and Illiberal Peace-building
in East Timor and Papua : Establishing Order in a Democratising State. Conflict, Security 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
 1 
Cover Page 
Liberal and Illiberal Peace-building in East Timor and Papua: Establishing Order 
in a Democratising State 
 
Claire Q. Smith 
Department of Politics, University of York, UK 
Correspondence: claire.smith@york.ac.uk; @claireqsmith; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
7479-4312 
Address: Politics, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD 
 
Biography 
Claire Q. Smith (PhD, LSE; MIA, Columbia; BA Hons, Oxford) is a lecturer in the 
Department of Politics, University of York. Smith’s research concentrates on national 
and sub-national processes of conflict and peace. She has published on the juncture of 
democratisation and peace-building in South-East Asia, focusing on Indonesia.   
 
Key words  




States undergoing turbulent processes of democratisation frequently use illiberal peace-
building methods to manage civil wars, as it enables them to secure order with the 
lowest risk. However, the existing literature on illiberal peace-building does not explain 
why governments sometimes opt for more liberal means, despite the risks involved. To 
explore this question, the paper draws on original primary sources and secondary 
evidence to compare the Indonesian government’s management of two civil wars during 
democratisation. The Papua and East Timor cases constitute an ideal comparative case 
study as the government took starkly different approaches to managing conflict in each 
region, within the same period. While East Timor was resolved via liberal methods, the 
Papua conflict was managed via illiberal means. I argue that two dimensions need 
greater recognition and interrogation within the existing illiberal peace-building 
framework to explain this difference: first, the role of shifting internal power balances 
within national political elites, especially civilian-military relations and the relative 
power of moderates; and, second, the influence of external actors on these internal 
power balances. 
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Liberal and Illiberal Peace-building in East Timor and Papua: 
Establishing Order in a Democratising State 
 
Introduction 
The objectives of this paper are both empirical and conceptual. I explore the puzzle of 
why the Indonesian government took two starkly different approaches to managing 
conflict in East Timor and Papua during the early period of democratisation (1998-2001). 
I consider why initial practices of ‘illiberal’ peace-building in East Timor shifted to a 
negotiated liberal approach during the first civilian presidency, under B.J. Habibie; but 
why, in contrast, illiberal peace-building prevailed in Papua under the subsequent 
president, Abdurrahman Wahid, despite initial steps towards conciliation. I explore the 
strengths and weaknesses of the illiberal peace-building literature in explaining the 
government’s different reaction to these two conflicts, and, from this analysis, I draw 
some broader points to develop the concept of illiberal peace-building.i  
 
Indonesia is an unfortunately good case for the study of peace-building approaches 
during post-authoritarian democratisation. Democratisation in late twentieth century 
Indonesia took place alongside the resurgence of several civil wars, multiple major 
incidents of ethno-religious violence, as well as a nationwide non-violent social 
movement for democracy. Looking within the same nation-state at different conflicts 
makes it possible to hold certain parameters relatively constant – state actors, political 
leadership, military force, social movements, and so on – in order to see the critical 
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differences between, and influences on, why the regime took different approaches to 
managing regional civil wars.ii 
 
For East Timor, a negotiated settlement brokered by the UN in 1999 provided a political 
resolution to the 24-year conflict between the Indonesian government and Timorese 
resistance movement, enabling East Timor’s formal independence. Although, in 
hindsight, East Timor’s independence appeared inevitable, and Indonesia’s economic 
loss from the territory was comparatively small, the negotiated political settlement to the 
conflict was a violent and fragile process, nearly derailed on many occasions, and 
resisted by most of Indonesia’s political and military elite.iii In the neighbouring region 
of Papua, illiberal peace-building - underpinning a non-negotiated position - prevailed 
almost throughout the early phase of democratisation, with a briefly more conciliatory 
approach and opening towards dialogue rapidly undermined.iv Two moderate civilian 
leaders implemented these contrasting approaches to conflict in two neighbouring 
regions, both within a broadly liberal interventionist international environment. I seek to 
explain here why the illiberal model to managing conflict prevailed in Papua, with the 
support of international governments, while in East Timor this approach was overturned.  
 
During the Suharto regime, the territories of both East Timor and Papua were 
aggressively incorporated into the unitary Indonesian state. While the military processes 
of annexation were similar, the political rationale and approach was different: and this 
had long-running effects. Having been part of the Netherlands East Indies, Papua was 
claimed in Indonesia’s 1945 declaration of independence.v For Sukarno’s government, 
continued Dutch presence in Papua through to 1961 posed a strategic risk to national 
unity. When Suharto took power in 1965, the political pressure to take official control of 
 4 
the territory only mounted. In contrast, East Timor was a Portuguese colony until 1974. 
With the collapse of Portuguese rule and the temporary triumph of a leftist government 
under Fretelin, following a brief civil war in 1975, East Timor posed a different kind of 
political threat for the anti-leftist Suharto government.vi 
 
The two territorial annexations were received quite differently in international fora 
during the Cold War. The UN recognised Indonesia’s claim to Papua following the UN-
supervised 1969 “Act of Free Choice”, but gave no such recognition of Indonesia’s 
occupation of East Timor. This different international reception to Indonesia’s claims to 
both territories had long running effects on East Timor and Papua. The perception of 
both territories as national security threats, although for different reasons, continued to 
influence Indonesian politics into the late 1990s, within the military and more nationalist 
political parties, but even within more reformist wings of the new government.vii 
 
Following Indonesia’s official annexation of Papua in 1969, and the military occupation 
of East Timor in 1975, the government rolled out highly repressive and militarised 
modes of rule in similar ways across both territories. Suharto’s government relied on a 
heavy security presence, civilian repression, and infrastructure and fiscal development 
investments in both territories. During more peaceful times locally brokered deals and 
occasional ceasefires between local leaders and government and military representatives 
were possible. These processes together formed a ‘thick’ version of illiberal peace-
building, a method outlined further below.viii Once democratisation got underway in the 
late 1990s, the central government’s approach towards the two regions diverged. I 
propose that two aspects of illiberal peace-building analysis need developing further to 
explain this critical policy divergence, which had profound effects on each region. 
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The liberal peace-building literature focuses on the influence of international 
organisations, which means it has limited relevance to a context like Indonesia’s. The 
concept of illiberal peace-building is more useful as it focuses on national approaches to 
internal conflict management. However, the illiberal peace-building literature has not yet 
elaborated why domestic regimes shift strategies, between more or less illiberal 
approaches. I contend that internal political dynamics mean that particular tensions 
within governments can, at key moments, create new more liberal pathways for conflict 
resolution. Further, while it is a useful corrective to focus on national dynamics, the 
illiberal peace-building literature has not sufficiently accounted for the impact of 
international pressures on internal politics. In comparing the two cases here, I find that a 
combination of shifting internal regime dynamics and variations in international 
responses had important effects on why these two conflicts were treated differently by 
the newly democratising Indonesian government.ix  
 
On the first issue, the illiberal peace-building literature has tended to treat states 
practicing illiberal peace-building as hegemonic and static, largely because of the 
literature’s focus on authoritarian practices. While the literature has explained variance 
between more or less illiberal methods across regimes, it has not accounted for this 
variance within regimes.x This paper highlights how democratising regimes are dynamic 
political organisations, vulnerable to pressures from competing parties, intra-elite 
conflicts and coalitions, as well as newly powerful interest groups and social movements 
with influence at the elite level. All such domestic dynamics interact with the incentives 
to control regional independence movements via military and economic means, both of 
which form a central mechanism of illiberal peace-building practice. The cases here 
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show that rapidly shifting internal power balances within the political and military elite, 
and their wider supporting groups, played a key role in driving a more liberal approach 
towards East Timor. However, this shift only took place when a particular constellation 
of external pressures also threatened key state interests. As internal power balances 
shifted back, in a more conservative direction, government policy reverted to preserving 
order in Papua via illiberal means, alongside ongoing nationwide democratic reforms.xi  
 
The contrasting international response to domestic policy was critical in determining the 
ways the government responded to resurgent demands for independence. The contrast 
between the historical legal and political positions of the international community 
towards Papua and East Timor was exacerbated by international attention to and civil 
society action on East Timor alone. To understand the variation in national government 
strategy across these two places, we therefore need to analyse not only internal politics, 
but the role of international influences on internal dynamics in producing more or less 
liberal approaches to peace-building during democratisation.  
 
In broader policy terms, several key issues from these cases bear relevance across South-
East Asia in 2019, where various governments undergo national political change while 
managing enduring regional conflicts, including in Myanmar, Thailand, and the 
Philippines. First, international policymakers who provide support for internal 
moderates can have a big impact on balances of power. Dramatic moderate shifts within 
apparently recalcitrant governments, like Indonesia’s in the period analysed here, can 
surprise even the closest observers. Second, promoting liberal settlements for particular 
conflicts can unleash a nationalist backlash from more hardline factions in government 
towards other conflicts. This uneven approach can undermine the prospects for more 
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liberal and nationally driven solutions nationwide. Both the positive and negative 
aspects of international influence on internal power balances, and the impact this has on 
the nature and trajectory of peace-building, needs to be more fully accounted for.  
 
Negotiated settlements and illiberal peace-building 
In this paper, I consider the under-examined field of national approaches to peace-
building in transitional regimes, in particular why illiberal methods fail, succeed, or 
evolve. This responds to Cederman and Vogt’s concern that despite the wide array of 
studies on termination and resolution in the civil wars literature, crucial gaps remain in 
understanding the phases of and endings to internal conflicts. xii  Based on the 
comparative analysis of two cases from Indonesia’s transition, I reflect on the limits of 
the main arguments established thus far in the illiberal peace-building literature. To do 
so, I draw on studies of mass atrocity endings and conflict negotiations.  
 
Civil wars are often fought over regional ethnic territory.xiii In ‘regional ethnic conflicts’ 
a regionally concentrated ethnic rebel group (or groups) is concerned with establishing 
control over a specific territory, ‘homeland’ or ‘nation’.xiv According to Zartman, the 
demand for regional self-government falls on a spectrum moving from local home rule 
to secession, “and it usually slides back and forth along the spectrum during the 
conflict.”xv For a negotiated end to regional civil war, a sustainable conflict resolution 
formula along this spectrum, satisfying rebels, resistance groups, and the central 
government, has to be found. Zartman argues that moderates within both the regime and 
rebel groups must play a powerful role, in order to be able to seize ‘ripe moments’ for 
political negotiations to take place.xvi Plus, a large enough coalition of parties must be 
interested in a negotiation to carry the rest of the group to settle the substantive issues.xvii 
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Moderate coalitions on each side are therefore responsible for securing political 
negotiations.xviii 
 
But negotiated political strategies are notoriously difficult to achieve: while attempted in 
half of civil wars between 1940 and 1992, they succeeded in less than one third, and in 
most cases combatants chose to return to war. xix  The risks inherent in negotiated 
settlements underpin why non-negotiated illiberal peacebuilding approaches are more 
popular for democratising or transitional states.xx For regimes simultaneously attempting 
to stabilise control of the centre, maintain political order across their territory, and 
manage transitional reforms, open-ended negotiated approaches to resolve regional 
ethnic conflicts are usually too high risk. Illiberal peace-building approaches, which 
focus on achieving overall political stability without offering negotiated political 
resolutions, can therefore be preferable. As these methods frequently draw on non-
liberal and authoritarian modes of conflict management, they have been collectively 
described as “illiberal peace-building”, a term I elaborate on below.xxi  
 
Illiberal peace-building describes a range of nationally driven (as opposed to 
internationalised) practices aimed at managing sub-national conflicts, which diverge 
from prevailing liberal and post-liberal models in three key respects.xxii First, illiberal 
peacebuilding contexts tend to have reasonably functioning states, without the heavy 
engagement of international interventions, and have been dominated by domestically-led 
processes. Second, forms of clientelism, co-option, and predation dominate over neo-
liberal economic measures to achieve a form of ‘peace’. Third, illiberal norms of order, 
frequently based on repression, tend to trump liberal norms of liberty and equality.xxiii In 
many contexts, at least in the short to medium term, these practices have produced 
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relatively stable political orders, minimising widespread violence, via the establishment 
of some form of “sustained hegemonic control” over a conflict-affected area.xxiv  
 
Until the 2010s, these nationally-driven modes of managing internal conflicts received 
much less attention in the literature than internationalised peace-building methods, but 
since then these modes have been increasingly recognised as common practice in many 
parts of the world.xxv As Smith et al argue, a body of work has now grown around 
analysing these modes of conflict management as a distinctive set, rather than 
derogations from liberal practices.xxvi Mukherjee, for example, argues that developing 
states in Asia tend to manage enduring regional ethnic conflicts via illiberal 
“containment” methods.xxvii Such methods - a form of “thin” illiberal peace-building, 
which I explain further below - reduce violence in the interests of overall state order, but 
do not substantively resolve conflicts. In other cases, more militarised and authoritarian 
interventions - “thick” illiberal peace-building - have been strategically deployed, as in 
Sri Lanka, with the aim of terminating (not containing) civil wars.xxviii  
 
Toft and Walter have shown that outright military victory, found at the most extreme 
end of “illiberal” peace-building, can be a more effective end to civil wars than either 
liberal negotiated or illiberal containment approaches. xxix  However, as Mukherjee 
argues, such methods are difficult for many developing countries to implement due to 
their high economic cost when balanced against other public spending demands. In 
contrast, modes of containment can minimise costs and risks, while being less 
conclusive.xxx Democratising states also face political constraints given rising scrutiny 
over anti-civilian military actions from domestic and international actors. Negative 
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publicity can provoke international sanctions, even intervention, prolonging political 
instability even further.xxxi I return to these points in the case comparison.  
 
‘Illiberal peacebuilding’ practices vary substantially across both “thin” and “thick” 
models. ‘Thin’ modes rely on a securitised and development focused mode of conflict 
management.xxxii These ‘thinner’ modes may include some reformist elements, and may 
be intended as interim conflict containment stages towards more liberal negotiated 
solutions, but the risks to state stability are perceived as too great for negotiations in the 
short term. A negotiated end state may never be reached. xxxiii  In contrast, “thicker” 
versions of illiberal peace-building are more authoritarian and highly militarised, and the 
illiberal means are the ends.xxxiv “Thicker” versions avoid formally negotiated solutions, 
although interim localised deals can still sometimes be reached. Both thin and thick 
versions share the same short-term intention of containing large-scale violence against 
the state, producing overall regime stability and protecting contested territorial 
integrity. xxxv  In many cases illiberal methods have achieved these goals, allowing 
reasonable functioning of the state, although often with profound long-term costs.xxxvi 
 
“Thinner” illiberal peace-building has proved a practical way to maintain a degree of 
political order in transitional states by containing conflict at relatively low levels of 
violence, and providing sufficient political stability for central regimes to maintain 
power across contested territories, at least temporarily.xxxvii More liberal governance or 
economic policies may be deployed at key moments, such as the redistribution of 
government funds to sub-national groups, in order to placate resistance groups.xxxviii The 
“management” of civil wars via these processes also allows for informal and formal deal 
making at the sub-national level to reduce conflict, minimise violence, and avoid 
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exacerbating political crisis in the interests of overall stability.xxxix Such deals do not 
allow rebels or resistance groups to substantively renegotiate membership of the central 
state, but they provide scope for limited reforms, and may allow for more liberal and 
democratic trajectories in the future.xl These thinner illiberal modes of peace-building 
can sometimes be preferable to governments (and populations) than continued war.xli 
 
The more militarised “thicker” versions of illiberal peace-building are comparatively 
more expensive and controversial. xlii While low levels of violence continue under “thin” 
arrangements, it is not at the same levels of “thicker” more repressive versions. By 
deploying thin illiberal peace-building, governments can limit (although not eliminate) 
state violence, meaning they can generally manage to maintain support from liberal 
international allies, without having to fully commit to an open and democratic political 
solution to regional conflicts.xliii States applying these methods may also lobby Western 
allies extensively to ensure that human rights pressures are kept to a minimum, in return 
for an apparent liberalisation in conflict regions. xliv  “Thin” illiberal peace-building 
methods therefore offer many advantages to democratising states seeking to increase 
political order across their territory at the lowest political and economic risk. 
 
Where the illiberal peace-building literature is limited, however, is in its ability to 
explain why a risk-averse and stability-focused government, like Indonesia’s newly 
established democratic regime, would move away from such illiberal methods, and 
towards much riskier, more liberal, negotiated conflict resolution policies, potentially 
threatening overall political order. It is this puzzle that I seek to explain here. I argue that 
conflict management policies in democratising regimes are dependent not only on the 
formation and nature of their institutions and broader interests, but also on how elites 
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within the regime bargain and contest for the power to influence these outcomes. I argue 
that these elite dynamics have international as well as national dimensions that need 
unpacking to understand national decisions over regional conflicts. 
 
Drawing on the insights from Zartman’s analysis of civil war negotiations, I explore the 
factors that triggered the Indonesian government to move away from an illiberal 
approach towards an internationally negotiated and liberal settlement in East Timor. I 
consider the role of and constraints on moderate leaders, both within the Indonesian 
government and wider political elite. Further, I seek to understand the external pressures 
required for this shift to a more liberal peace-building approach, and the long-term 
impact this had on an enduring illiberal approach to the Papua conflict. I argue that a 
coalition of moderate leadership within the Indonesian government managed, at a 
particular moment, to achieve a resolution to the East Timor conflict, but not for Papua, 
where it lacked a substantive coalition for reform. The failure to achieve a negotiated 
resolution for Papua was exacerbated by the lack of substantive international support for 
such a settlement, due in part to the international community’s recognition of 
Indonesia’s right to govern Papua from 1969 onwards.xlv  
 
Overall, then, in the empirical discussion that follows, I argue that it is attention to 
internal power balances - and within this, the role of moderates and civil-military 
relations - and the effects of external pressures on these power balances, that is currently 
missing from illiberal peace-building analysis. I show how attention to these factors 
sheds light on how more liberal and negotiated peace-building strategies emerged in the 
Indonesia case, despite the risks involved. These findings have relevance both to 
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developing the concept of illiberal peace-building, and to a better understanding of 
peace-building processes in democratising states.  
 
Regime responses to two regional conflicts  
For nearly three decades, the Suharto regime presided over three civil wars, in Aceh, 
Papua and East Timor. In these three conflicts the Indonesian military sustained the most 
persistent resistance from both armed rebel, clandestine and civilian organisations.xlvi 
Papua and East Timor were largely contained by the regime in military terms by the 
1980s, via similar modes of military annexation.xlvii The Aceh civil war, in contrast, 
remained active through to the mid 2000s. However, in Papua and East Timor, non-
armed civil activists and small numbers of armed units managed to survive the 
authoritarian era. In the run up to Suharto’s fall, and as he stepped down, political 
leaders in both regions renewed their long-standing calls for independence.xlviii  
 
With significant social and political pressure from domestic organisations, and economic 
pressure from global financial institutions, the Indonesian government removed Suharto 
from power in 1998. This was one of Indonesia’s most significant moments of political 
change since the establishment of national independence in the late 1940s and the anti-
communist genocide of 1965-1966.xlix The new government had to rapidly implement 
major political reforms, while also maintaining political stability in the centre, which 
meant placating the military and established political elite. At this critical political 
juncture, many regional leaders across Indonesia demanded a change to the terms by 
which they were governed, but in Papua and East Timor they also renewed their call for 
self-government.l The central government initially responded by reinforcing an illiberal 
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response to both regions: increasing levels of violence by military forces and pro-
government militia against civil dissent.li   
 
At first, it seemed that independence activists were more active in East Timor than 
Papua, and the military response was concurrently harsher. But this perception was 
fuelled by the lack of outside organisations and foreign media reporting from Papua. lii 
The greater levels of coordination across the Timorese resistance, between civilian 
activists in Indonesian cities, the clandestine front, and diplomatic wings, and the more 
established and internationalised campaign, meant both the cause of the resistance, and 
Indonesian military and militia violence against it, was better publicised.liii Both regions 
raised similar demands for a political dialogue on independence, and the military 
responded to these demands in a similar illiberal fashion. Eventually, however, these 
two regions experienced different outcomes. 
 
Within two years of Indonesian democratisation, East Timor was permitted to hold a 
referendum on formal independence, rapidly followed by military-led violence, UN 
intervention, supervised military withdrawal, and Indonesia’s political withdrawal of 
claimed sovereignty by October 1999.liv In contrast, during the same timeframe, Papua 
experienced initial violence, a brief period of low-level dialogue during the Papuan 
Spring (1998-2000), which subsequently collapsed, and was followed by a return to a 
broadly illiberal peace-building approach from the government. The following sections 
consider the reasons behind these contrasting outcomes in more detail.  
 
East Timor  
 15 
Several factors in the late 1990s affected the Indonesian government’s response to the 
East Timor conflict. Underpinning these was the fact that the UN had never formally 
accepted Indonesia’s invasion and annexation of East Timor from 1975. This situation 
directly contrasts with how the history of how the UN responded to Papua’s 
incorporation. Following a brief history of the international position on East Timor, I 
outline the four contemporary factors that shifted Indonesia’s response in the late 1990s. 
The first factor to consider is the critical role of Habibie as the new civilian president. 
Second, the influence of transnational pro-Timorese civil society and diaspora networks 
was also important. Third, the role of international pressure affected both civilian and 
military branches of leadership in new ways. Fourth, the military’s response to this set of 
pressures, and eventual agreement to a political solution to the conflict, in return for 
maintaining a hardline approach elsewhere, finally shifted the balance.  
 
Following East Timor’s brief period of civil war in 1975, after the collapse of 
Portuguese colonial rule, a leftist Timorese government took power under the Fretelin 
party and declared independence. Indonesia then invaded and annexed East Timor 
between 1975 and 1976, with Cold War backing of the US and major Western allies, 
including Australia, who justified it in terms of preventing a communist domino effect.lv 
The Security Council and the General Assembly condemned the 1975 invasion, and the 
East Timor situation remained on the UN agenda over the following decades, although 
Indonesia’s policy did not substantively change until the late 1990s.lvi Although Cold 
War politics meant that Indonesia’s major Western allies did not advocate for 
Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor, the UN maintained direct and continuing 
interest in finding a political resolution to the conflict. 
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By the early 1980s, massive Indonesian counter-insurgency operations had largely 
crushed Falintil, the armed wing of the Timorese resistance, although it was never 
entirely eliminated, remaining a source of symbolic resistance. In the wake of the four-
year military campaign to repress the territory, known as the “Encirclement and 
Annihilation” strategy, the Indonesian government established a vast network of military 
surveillance and repressive operations throughout the territory, and both the armed and 
civilian resistance went underground or into exile.lvii Until Suharto’s fall in 1998, the 
military saw the ongoing occupation of East Timor as a core part of protecting 
Indonesia’s ‘territorial integrity.’ This view lasted well into the Reformasi (reform) era 
among much of the political class and military elite, although some in the civilian elite 
began to criticise Indonesia’s occupation through the late 1990s.lviii  
 
While the position of most of the national political elite in Jakarta over East Timor did 
not change leading up to Suharto’s fall from power, the international political position 
rapidly evolved under increasing pressure from pro-Timorese networks. As East Timor 
had never been recognised as a formal part of Indonesia meant civil society and 
Timorese diplomatic activists had been able to push their claim to independence through 
the 1980s and 1990s. The pro-independence Timorese leadership, both within Indonesia 
and in exile, in collaboration with a number of international human rights and activist 
organisations, increasingly lobbied international political leaders and multilateral 
organisations. Following widespread military defeat by the 1980s, the Timorese 
leadership had shifted to a politically-focused approach, via building this transnational 
network. This network helped to raise attention to East Timor at the UN General 
Assembly and Security Council through the 1990s.lix International attention magnified 
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following international publicity of the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 and two further 
international events.lx  
 
International interest in the Timorese case mounted when the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded to East Timor’s Catholic Bishop Belo and the exiled Timorese leader, Jose 
Ramos Horta, reflecting the powerful advocacy of both the Catholic Church and 
Timorese activists and leaders both within Indonesia and internationally. lxi  In 1997, 
South African President Mandela was granted a meeting with the imprisoned Timorese 
leader Xanana Gusmao in Jakarta, further raising international interest. In 1997, the UN 
Secretary General then appointed a Personal Representative to push for a negotiated 
solution for East Timor.lxii The UN had continued to seek a political settlement to the 
Timor situation since its occupation, but both national and international factors had not 
enabled this to take place. When other political factors shifted internally in Indonesia, 
alongside mounting pressure on the UN from the Timorese leadership, the Catholic 
Church and international civil society activists, this paved the way for a UN-backed 
resolution by the late 1990s.  
 
In January 1999, the new Indonesian President Habibie took the decision - without the 
agreement of his key advisors, or most of the military leadership - to allow a referendum 
on East Timor’s status.lxiii  The reasons behind Habibie’s decision are still contested, as 
is the military leader Wiranto’s eventual support for it.lxiv For Habibie, East Timor, was 
the “pebble in the shoe”, as his senior advisors called it, undermining Indonesia’s 
democratic status, and which he sought to resolve conclusively with a referendum.lxv For 
Habibie to achieve the widespread political reforms and economic recovery he sought 
domestically, he also needed international support: a referendum on East Timor was a 
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way to build this international credibility. The decision gained him some domestic 
support, as, although Habibie’s decision ran against the positions of many in Indonesia’s 
political elite, it won him support among parts of the reform movement, some of whom 
were also rising politicians, and national human rights organisations. Observers close to 
Habibie at the time claimed he wanted be seen as a genuine democrat among both the 
national reform movement and the international community.lxvi Crucially, Habibie, his 
advisors and Wiranto, did not foresee an anti-Indonesian vote: they saw the referendum 
as a way to settle the East Timor problem “once and for all”.lxvii  
 
Habibie’s decision to allow a referendum in East Timor was resisted by many most of 
the political establishment and the military, although supported by Wiranto, the TNI 
chief.lxviii However, once offered, it was impossible to withdraw.lxix This internal dissent 
within the post-Suharto civilian and military elite over the referendum opened a political 
window for the Timorese leadership. They perceived that Habibie’s position, with 
Wiranto’s support, was deeply fragile and unlikely to survive military and political 
opposition.lxx Xanana Gusmao, the imprisoned Timorese leader and former commander 
of the armed resistance, along with the international Timorese coalition for 
independence, both perceived that the referendum offer could be quickly revoked. lxxi 
Thus, however flawed in organisation, the referendum was seized by the Timorese 
leadership in exile and within Indonesia, as a key step towards enabling a political 
settlement towards formal independence. Transnational activists rapidly pressured 
governments in Portugal, Australia, and the US, to support the referendum.lxxii  
 
The situation escalated towards a political solution at the international level, which the 
Indonesian government was pressured on all sides to accept, alongside fierce resistance 
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on the ground. The TNI, along with their locally-deployed nationalist paramilitaries, 
responded to the September 4 1999 referendum’s pro-independence result with extreme 
force, killing nearly two thousand civilians, burning and destroying much of East 
Timor’s infrastructure, and displacing tens of thousands of people. lxxiii  International 
journalists were in East Timor, along with the UN Supervisory Mission, reporting on the 
rising violence. As internal tensions rose over how to respond, and violence in the 
territory by military-organised militia groups escalated, this was matched by a non-
violent coordinated response from the Timorese resistance movement from both the 
armed and clandestine wings. The crisis escalated with violence from one side only, due 
largely to Xanana’s decision to insist that the armed resistance leader TMR barrack the 
remaining Timorese remaining forces, estimated at less than a few hundred by this point 
but still with armed capabilities. lxxivThis decision was crucial in enabling international 
support for the Timorese to continue during the escalating post-referendum violence.  
 
As the post-ballot violence rose, Habibie’s government faced a difficult choice. The 
government needed to regain nationalist military and civilian support, which they lost 
over the referendum, and so Habibie resisted further international intervention during the 
violence. lxxv  But the international community responded to the rising crisis by 
threatening widespread bilateral and multilateral sanctions unless the government 
effectively controlled the violence.lxxvi  
 
Habibie faced a united and unprecedented front at key international economic fora, 
including the major regional economic meeting of APEC, and both the IMF and World 
Bank made continued financial aid contingent on an end to the East Timor violence. lxxvii 
The government needed this international aid and finance to continue to shore up the 
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economy, but by September 1999 three quarters of the $12.3 billion IMF bailout had still 
to be transferred. lxxviii  The threat of economic sanctions came at a critical time for 
Habibie’s government in Indonesia’s post-economic crisis reconstruction process. When 
the US then threatened military sanctions, targeting the core of Indonesian national 
interests even further, rapidly followed by the decision to ready an international military 
force led by the Australians, Habibie’s government faced a crisis point. As the President 
sought to balance the competing interests of international organisations, and the national 
political and military elite, this tension was unsustainable. Finally, in late September 
1999, Habibie and Wiranto conceded to international pressure, and barracked Indonesian 
troops as international deployment was imminent.lxxix  
As Zartman argues, escalations in conflict can play a role in creating turning points for 
negotiations. lxxx  With escalating and well-publicised military and militia violence 
through 1999, the international community pushed harder for a political settlement for 
East Timor via the threat of sanctions and military intervention. The combined efforts of 
international civil society pressure on Western governments and at the UN produced a 
period of highly active diplomacy across the political and economic fronts.lxxxi Under 
these international threats, and with Wiranto’s eventual cooperation from the military, 
Habibie and the core political elite was finally pushed towards accepting a negotiated 
ending, despite remaining widespread military and political opposition.lxxxii  
As international pressure rose on both the economy and the military, the leadership’s 
decision to barrack Indonesian troops and control the pro-Indonesian militia were 
critical factors enabling a political solution to the Timor crisis. lxxxiii   Other military 
figures, especially the former Special Forces Commander, Prabowo, opposed Wiranto 
and took the hardline nationalist line, seeking to maintain occupation of East Timor. But 
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Wiranto recognized the damage international sanctions and potential military 
intervention would do to the military, as well as his own political position. lxxxiv The 
scenario of open confrontation with Australian troops heading a UN intervention was 
not one Wiranto wanted the Indonesian army to face.lxxxv The influence of Wiranto over 
the military at that time, in collaboration with the threat to core state interests under 
extreme international pressure, briefly reconfigured internal regime politics. This 
reconfiguration provided for a brief military-civilian leadership agreement over 
withdrawing the military from East Timor. lxxxvi  The government’s reliance on 
international financial and military aid made a crucial difference to the situation, with 
international actors temporarily able to influence decisions within both the military and 
civilian leadership. 
However, when the military finally, reluctantly, and under significant international 
pressure, enabled a political solution to the East Timor crisis, this did not by any means 
imply an overall shift in military policy towards the Indonesia’s other ongoing conflicts. 
Maneuvers within the military and political leadership enabled a trade-off: relinquishing 
military control of East Timor helped secure the military’s economic and territorial 
assets in other conflict regions.lxxxvii Further, Wiranto used the crisis to leverage control 
over his internal opponents, especially Prabowo. lxxxviii  Wiranto also ensured, ‘that 
Habibie’s political career rather than the army would bear the brunt of the repercussions, 
as subsequent events demonstrated. lxxxix  Wiranto temporarily shored up his political 
position in Jakarta, although he too shortly paid the price for enabling the East Timor 
withdrawal with a resurgent nationalist political and military elite.xc  
The brief moment of agreement between Western governments, transnational activists, 
Timorese independence leaders, and Indonesia’s civilian and military leadership, 
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towards achieving an internationally negotiated political settlement to the East Timor 
conflict ended almost as soon as it had begun. East Timor left a scar, in the words of one 
high-level Indonesian official.xci An externally enforced political solution to the East 
Timor crisis, culminating in formal independence, upset the political elite across the 
national spectrum, and triggered renewed hardline nationalism.  
Following East Timor’s secession, Habibie was discredited and subsequently lost the 
1999 election. Wiranto shifted the blame onto Habibie, and briefly survived politically, 
up to early 2000, by ramping up military activity and anti-secessionist policy in Papua 
and elsewhere. From this point onwards, the civilian and military elite were resistant to 
national political engagement in dialogue, or other more ‘liberal’ approaches, as well as 
opposed to enabling international involvement in regional conflicts. xcii  Indeed, the 
government’s handling of East Timor, and the military’s failure to ensure the ballot went 
in Indonesia’s favour, marked what Mietzner describes as, “the end of the early civil-
military transition”. This failure subsequently inhibited subsequent administrations from 
taking a more conciliatory and negotiated approach towards Papua.xciii 
 
Papua  
After Suharto’s resignation in 1998, Papuan politics was dominated by public demands 
for independence in a period known as the “Papuan Spring”. A brief period of open 
dialogue and conciliation between Jakarta and Papua under first Habibie and then 
Wahid’s earliest year in office quickly closed. Three key factors influenced the 
Indonesian government’s renewed illiberal response mode to the conflict in Papua from 
mid 2000, which I go through in this section. But underpinning these was the historical 
decisions by the international community during the Cold War to recognise Indonesia’s 
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claim to the territory. This international position underpinned the limited scope for 
influence that changing contemporary factors could have on the government’s response 
to the conflict, and had a long-lasting limiting effect on any claims Papuan pro-
independence leaders could make to renegotiate their territorial status. It also had a long-
running effect on the Indonesian political elite across the spectrum, who perceived 
Papua as a historic part of post-independence Indonesia.xciv 
 
After a brief history to Indonesia’s formal and internationally accepted incorporation of 
Papua into the Indonesian state, I consider three changing contemporary factors. First, I 
look at the fluctuating influence of the civilian presidencies from 1998 to 2001. Second, 
I consider the renewed influence of the military during this period, following the East 
Timor crisis. Third, I examine how the lack of international pressure on Indonesia over 
Papua, and the post-Timor reassertion of nationalist political and military elites, allowed 
for a renewed illiberal response. This approach then lasted through five further 
Presidential elections, through to 2019.  
 
During the late colonial era, the Dutch had administered the Western half of the island of 
New Guinea, and Indonesia included Papua in their 1945 proclamation of independence. 
However, Papua was not incorporated into the new Republic with the rest of the former 
Netherlands East Indies in the transfer of sovereignty in 1949.xcv The Dutch maintained 
that the territory was distinctive, requiring a separate governance arrangement.xcvi The 
new Indonesian government viewed the Dutch position as an ongoing campaign of 
colonialism and challenged their control of the territory.xcvii Following the 1961 Political 
Manifesto issued by the Papuan National Committee, at the First Papuan Peoples 
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Congress, which asserted the right of Papuans to establish their own nation, Indonesia 
responded by physically occupying the territory.xcviii  
 
As a result of the UN-negotiated New York Agreement of August 1962, Indonesia took 
over Papuan administration from the UN in May 1963, although it was not yet the 
official government. In 1969, following the highly flawed UN-supervised Act of Free 
Choice, provided for in the 1962 New York Agreement, the UN sanctioned Indonesia’s 
full incorporation of Western New Guinea. This was noted by the General Assembly on 
19 November 1969, in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2504.xcix Following 
UN Resolution 2504, the region was formally incorporated into the Indonesian state, 
removed from the UN agenda, and Indonesia renamed it Irian Jaya.c With roots in the 
1930s resistance to Dutch colonialism, Papuan independence activists re-launched their 
campaign for self-determination from 1969 onwards.ci  
From the early 1970s through to the early 1980s, Indonesia ran massive military and 
political repression operations across Papua to subdue the independence movement, in 
parallel with their operations in East Timor. cii  Tens of thousands of civilians were 
displaced, thousands more were killed, villages bombed, and highland populations 
encamped, as the full military and political weight of the Suharto military regime rolled 
out across the territory.ciii By 1998, outright conflict in Papua had been largely subdued, 
but political resistance remained, with many of the Papuan leadership in hiding, exile or 
jail.civ The independence movement had survived the Suharto regime politically, if not 
militarily, and demands for a dialogue over Papua’s status resurged in 1998.cv  
 
The promise of democratisation created the space for a “Papuan Spring.” Chauvel 
argues that, in the first year’s after Suharto’s resignation, “the public space in Papua was 
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dominated by the articulation of demands for independence.”cvi Habibie at first initiated 
a brief dialogue with Papuan leaders in 1998, and during government discussions over 
new regional autonomy legislation for Papua, a team of 100 Papuan leaders was invited 
to meet Habibie in Jakarta in February 1999. The Papuan “Team of 100” took the bold 
step of requesting independence at the meeting: apparently this had not been anticipated 
by Habibie.cvii After this initial meeting, under pressure from the wider political and 
military elite, Habibie’s government abandoned a more open conciliatory approach.cviii 
However, his successor, the first democratically elected President Wahid, then made 
further conciliatory moves. 
 
Early in 2000, newly elected President Wahid made two striking public expressions of 
conciliation towards Papua. First, he issued a decree enabling the provincial name to be 
changed from Irian Jaya to Papuacix; second, he permitted the Papuan nationalist flag, 
the Morning Star, to be flown alongside the Indonesian flag.cx Between May and June 
2000, Papuan leaders organised the Papuan Congress (Kongres Papua), at which over 
50,000 Papuans attended, and which was partly funded by Wahid.cxi This meeting was 
dubbed the Second Papuan People’s Congress, recognising the First Papuan People’s 
Congress of 1961, which had sought Papuan self-determination, and the Congress issued 
a statement rejecting the 1962 New York Agreement and the 1969 Act of Free Choice, 
and calling for international recognition of Papua’s sovereignty. cxii  A government 
intelligence memo at the time noted the widespread enthusiasm for independence 
throughout Papua after the Congress.cxiii While Papuan leaders and the local population 
took Wahid’s moves to be significant steps towards enabling independence negotiations, 
these actions triggered strong resistance from the military and wider political elite.cxiv 
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Wahid had turned out to be far more reformist than many of his supporters had 
expected.cxv His conciliatory approach to Indonesia’s ongoing and historical conflicts 
ignored advice that only military force would repress secessionist tendencies.cxvi Wahid 
also opened other highly sensitive historical issues by publicly apologising for the key 
role of the moderate traditional Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which he 
headed, in the 1965-66 anti-communist genocide. He removed some of the army’s most 
influential officers from central military positions by putting them in his cabinet, and 
carried out a variety of other reforms designed to exert greater civilian control over the 
military.cxvii But Wahid’s ability to support a conciliatory approach to Papua, along with 
his other reform initiatives, was short-lived, as the mainstream in the armed forces 
subsequently blocked and overturned them.cxviii 
 
The military’s response to Papuan activism from late 2000 became increasingly 
repressive and violent, with the detention of five leaders from the pro-independence 
Papuan Presidium Council (Presidium Dewan Papua) following a series of clampdowns 
on celebrations of Papuan “Independence Day” on 1 December 2000, and public 
displays of the Papuan flag. cxix  Further mass arrests, torture and disappearances 
undermined Papuan pro-independence activism.cxx One year later, in November 2001, 
Indonesian Special Forces assassinated one of Papua’s most senior peaceful pro-
independence leaders, Theys Eluay, who had taken part in the earlier political 
discussions with Wahid.cxxi Despite Wahid’s new political policies, the security forces 
made no distinction between non-armed political leaders and civilian activists, and 
armed rebel groups - both were treated as equal threats to the state.cxxii While Wahid had 
started his presidency with greater ambitions than Habibie to achieve political dialogue 
with Papua, and he had much greater popular support, his influence was eventually 
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limited by the reassertion of military power, the stagnation of his reform project, and a 
resurgent nationalist political elite.cxxiii  
 
Wahid’s reformist agenda on many issues, not only Papua, alienated many in the 
nationalist political elite and, combined with a variety of other political clashes, 
following his increasingly authoritarian and erratic behaviour, led to his gradual 
undermining and eventual impeachment.cxxiv Without significant international support 
from Western governments, the UN, or transnational civil society, for his conciliatory 
moves towards Papua, Wahid’s position had been unsustainable. cxxv The subsequent 
election of the more hardline nationalist Megawati, Wahid’s deputy, in late 2001, meant 
the resurgent illiberal approach towards managing the Papua conflict was cemented in 
government practice. Under Megawati, Papuan ambitions for greater dialogue and 
autonomy over the region’s governance was further undermined, by ongoing repressive 
security sector activities and via her more conservative nationalist agenda. cxxvi  The 
application of the new Special Autonomy (Otsus) legislation from late 2001 is a good 
example of how the prospects for increasing Papuan autonomy were further undermined.  
The first drafts of these reforms, started under Habibie and Wahid’s governments, had 
intended to reduce demands for Papuan independence by improving local governance, 
and included Papuan architects in the process. Indeed, earlier drafts reflected many 
Papuan demands, including full withdrawal of the military from the territory.cxxvii But all 
such content was removed during subsequent parliamentary negotiations. The final draft 
contained no provision for significant or substantive political or military reforms, 
allowing only for greater redistribution of economic revenues, under the rubric of 
governance reform.cxxviii Close observers saw the legislation as a renewed “divide and 
rule” policy, undermining substantive reforms with technical governance changes.cxxix  
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Implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, insofar as it could improve local self-
government, was then systematically undermined during the Megawati Presidency, 
culminating in the 2003 decision to divide Papua into two provinces, contrary to the 
original agreement.cxxx  
The way the 2001 reform package was undermined was part of the government’s “thin” 
illiberal peace-building strategy to balance different interests without substantive 
political reforms. Megawati’s government allowed sufficient local reforms to increase 
access for local elites to local government budgets, as a means to gain their support, 
while simultaneously preventing further independence protests via a repressive security 
policy, and undermining the regional spirit of the legislation.cxxxi The province wide 
reforms undermined earlier legislation that had increased Papuan representation in local 
government, thus pitting local Papuan elites against each other, and confusing local 
government legislation further. cxxxii  Meanwhile, the central government campaigned 
both at home and overseas to shore up international respect of its status and policies in 
Papua. cxxxiii  Megawati’s strategy, dubbed the ‘Prosperity Approach,’ focused on this 
package of security force repression, the implementation of a regional investment and 
development strategy, and the complicated reorganisation of local governance via 
Special Autonomy legislation. cxxxiv  Political intimidation, assault, murder and 
incarceration of suspected pro-independence political groups continued alongside these 
partial reforms over the next two decades, limited overt resistance.cxxxv  
 
By the late 1990s, the UN position on Papua had not changed, with limited international 
pressure put on Jakarta to recognise the self-determination and negotiation demands of 
the pro-independence leaders. As neither the UN nor Indonesia’s major Western allies 
changed their position on Papua, there was limited international scrutiny of Indonesian 
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actions in Papua, despite the efforts of the pro-independence Papuan exile groups to 
raise the issue. cxxxvi  By the 2010s support for Papua was increasingly raised via the 
Pacific island state forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, and from 2016, pro-Papuan 
civil society groups called for an independence referendum on Papua’s status in the UK 
and elsewhere.cxxxvii But these initiatives failed to reach the levels required for any major 
power to pressure the Indonesian government sufficiently to find an alternative approach 
to the Papuan conflict, while the Indonesian government continued to lobby against the 
pro-Papuan narrative.cxxxviii The government’s ongoing violence against Papuan civilians 
and activists in 2019 continued to avoid significant international scrutiny, which was 
compounded by the continued difficulties of independent access to monitors and 
journalists to the territory.cxxxix  
From the 2000s onwards, the majority of Papuan activists and political leaders shifted to 
a non-violent response mode within Indonesia. They also shifted their agenda into the 
international arena by 2015, concluding this was their best chance of opening a dialogue 
on Papua’s official status. cxl  The history of integration into Indonesia, and the 
international community’s recognition of Indonesia’s claim, made international lobbying 
by pro-independence groups, such as the United Liberation Movement for West Papua 
(ULMWP), much more difficult than it was for the Timorese activists.cxli By 2019, the 
political conflict in Papua remained unresolved, and continued to be managed via a 
package of increased economic spending, limited local governance reforms, and heavy 
security with impunity, in a ‘thin’ version of illiberal peace-building.  
With the continued arrests, assassinations and torture of political activists in 2019, and 
ongoing violence in the highlands, the costs for Papuans to demand a political resolution 
to the conflict continued to be deadly, 20 years after the Papuan Spring. cxlii   The 
 30 
government continued to blame local violent incidents on separatists, but independent 
reports separately attributed these protests to a wider array of local political issues.cxliii 
The following section reflects on the different outcomes in these two neighbouring 
conflicts, illuminating some of the gaps in the illiberal peace-building literature in 
explaining the central government’s divergent responses.  
 
Revisiting the concept of illiberal peace-building  
As I outlined at the start, the term illiberal peace-building describes a range of national 
practices to manage, rather than resolve, regional conflicts, which draw largely on 
illiberal and economically focused methods to reduce overt violence, avoiding formal 
political settlements.cxliv The illiberal peace-building literature helps explain the newly 
democratic Indonesian government’s initial preference for the deployment of ‘thin’ 
illiberal peace-building methods. However, it does not account for the subsequent 
evolution of the government’s conflict policy, including the temporary period of 
conciliation towards Papua, and the eventual negotiated solution for East Timor.  
 
I find that two crucial factors are missing in the illiberal peace-building framework, to 
explain the differences between the cases here. First, changing internal power balances 
within the government, and, in particular, the rise of moderate leadership, in competition 
with more hardline and military factions, had important policy influences at a crucial 
moment during democratic transition. Second, the international community, by 
supporting either moderate or hardline positions over the conflicts, and influenced by the 
historical factor of international recognition of Papua’s incorporation into Indonesia, 
was also critical in explaining why particular modes of peace-building came to the fore. 
The interaction between these national and international factors explains how 
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momentary spaces for a negotiated solution emerged in one case, despite overall 
government preferences for illiberal solutions. 
 
Internal regime dynamics  
Mukherjee’s discussion of containment provides a useful starting point to analyse why 
Asian states prefer ‘thin’ modes of illiberal peace-building.cxlv The problem with this 
approach is that it treats states as behaving similarly, regardless of whether they are in 
the process of reform, or of changing internal power configurations. Political elites in 
states engaged in regional conflicts are too often treated as monolithic, and opposed to 
political approaches in all instances. cxlvi  The two cases here showed that Indonesia 
during democratisation was highly contested, and under particular conditions, domestic 
power configurations rapidly shifted the government’s responses to regional 
conflicts.cxlvii These responses varied depending on changing domestic and international 
political pressures, the type of leaders in place, and the balance of power in civil-military 
relations. Treating the Indonesian government as purely recalcitrant and violent in its 
approach to internal conflicts misses significant evolutions in the national leadership, 
which were then lost to a resurgence of hardline nationalists.  
 
The illiberal peace-building literature has not yet accounted for internal national regime 
dynamics. But these internal dynamics mean that particular tensions within governments 
can, at key moments, create new more liberal pathways for conflict resolution. As 
Zartman argues, moderates can play a critical part in enabling negotiated endings.cxlviii 
Democratising regimes are dynamic political organisations, vulnerable to pressures from 
competing parties, intra-elite conflicts and coalitions, as well as newly powerful interest 
groups and social movements with influence at the elite level.cxlix All such domestic 
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dynamics interact with the incentives to control secessionist movements via other 
military and bargaining means. The competing interests within regional conflicts were 
weighed up by the central government, as they attempted to maintain overall power and 
order, while simultaneously protecting their own interests. As such, certain domestic 
balances of power lead to more moderate conflict approaches; other balances of power 
lead to more illiberal approaches.   
 
Thus, analysis of ‘thin’ versions of illiberal peace-building in democratising regimes is a 
useful starting point to understand civil war management in Asian states, but it can only 
go so far. Indonesia during democratisation favored illiberal solutions to civil wars at 
some points, but more liberal and negotiated positions to others, as internal power 
balances shifted. When both moderate and reformist presidents Habibie and Wahid 
attempted to open dialogue towards Papua, this was directly challenged by the military 
and wider political elite on all sides. Both presidents did not have sufficient political 
capital (or interest) nationally and internationally to push a negotiated approach through 
for Papua, following the East Timor settlement.cl  
Peace-building policies in democratising regimes are dependent not only on the 
formation and nature of their institutions and broader interests, but also on how elites 
within the regime bargain and contest to influence these outcomes. These elite dynamics 
need further unpacking to understand national decisions over regional conflicts, perhaps 
in the vein of the “elite bargains” literature in relation to economic development 
patterns.cli Tracing the evolution of national and sub-national elite bargains helps unpack 
the rationale behind changing regime policies towards managing civil wars during 
democratisation, when elites seek to maintain order and defend their own interests, as 
internal and external circumstances rapidly shift.  
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The comparative cases here showed that shifts within the national political elite played a 
key role in generating new policies towards two enduring conflicts. Understanding the 
nature of and shifting relations between moderates and hardliners, and between civilian 
and military forces, is critical to understanding how and when conflict management 
policies shift. The comparison here showed that even when the national military 
leadership promoted a militarised “thicker” mode of illiberal peace-building, this did not 
necessarily triumph. With a particular moderate coalition of national leadership, when 
backed by significant international support, more liberal options became possible.  
Of particular importance to Indonesia’s rapidly evolving policies towards conflict during 
the democratic transition was the changing role of the military. When the military stood 
to lose influence and control over East Timor, this needed to be regained in other 
contested territories and in central politics. Accounting for the internal elite trade-offs 
made in this decision forms a vital part in explaining the puzzle of why the East Timor 
conflict was eventually negotiated, but Papua was not. By allowing East Timor to secede, 
via a negotiated political solution, the military could then push for a return to illiberal 
peace-building in Papua, as international support waned.clii 
Further, to understand the Indonesian government’s reluctance to open discussions over 
Papua, during the early phase of democratisation (1998-2001), and under subsequent 
presidencies, it is important to recognise that this conflict continued to provide political 
– not only economic - capital to significant elements of ruling elite. This political capital 
was even more important to the military following the loss of East Timor, which while 
never a significant economic asset, had reflected their extensive political control. 
Illiberal peace-building analysis focuses heavily on the political economy of conflict 
management, in particular the economic trade-offs and deals made in managing conflict. 
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But ideological and political elements are also crucial for explaining the persistence of 
illiberal patterns, as Lewis et al recognise.cliii Preserving centralised control over Papua 
helped hardline nationalists in both the political and military wings of government 
maintain power, by exploiting the existential threat against the nation state. This 
discursive act is a common feature of regimes practicing illiberal peace-building 
worldwide, not only particular to Indonesia.cliv  
The two-case comparison showed that by tracing shifting patterns of national elite 
bargains, and the evolving nature of elite political interests, the changes – and 
consistencies – in national level approaches to regional conflicts can be unpacked. 
Doing so deepens our understanding of national peace-building practices, rather than 
assuming that national approaches will be consistently authoritarian, economically-
focused and hegemonic.  
 
International influence  
The other crucial factor influencing the national government’s different response to the 
two regional conflicts was the changing international political environment. The 
international dimension is largely missing in the illiberal peace-building literature, but it 
proved critical in determining the different peace-building approach in these cases.clv  
 
Under international law, East Timor was not recognised as a part of Indonesia, and the 
UN maintained that it had a responsibility to resolve the conflict, two facts which greatly 
aided the Timorese cause when the national political environment shifted in the late 
1990s. With increasing UN attention to the East Timor crisis, combined with increased 
pressures on the liberal group of states led by the US, this threatened some of the core 
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interests of the Indonesian government. When combined with a moderate and reformist 
presidential leadership, this combination of factors enabled a negotiated response 
towards East Timor. In contrast, in Papua, without significant international interest, the 
government’s ‘thin’ illiberal peace-building approach could ‘remain under the mass 
atrocities radar’, without substantive reforms. clvi  While preventing open negotiations 
with armed members of secessionist groups, and non-armed secessionist activists, the 
illiberal approach applied in Papua enabled informal and formal deal making, permitting 
some reforms at the sub-national level and reducing a level of violence.clvii This policy 
achieved a degree of ‘political order’, rather than a substantive form of peace.clviii  
 
Illiberal peace-building analysis has not discussed the impacts that international scrutiny 
may have on domestic behaviour towards regional conflicts, in terms of recalibrating 
policies to be more or less authoritarian. But the cases here showed that external 
pressure affected the scale, if not the mode, of illiberal peace-building. Following East 
Timor’s independence, the government feared further international intervention, but in 
the absence of a re-opening of the international legal status over Indonesia’s 
incorporation of Papua, and an ongoing lack of substantive international interest in 
Papua, a policy of thin illiberal peacebuilding was sufficient to maintain overall order. 
By mimicking democratic reforms, expanding economic development, and reducing 
mass atrocities against civilians, the government was also able to minimise international 
interference in Papua.clix  
 
As Conley-Zilkic finds, the integration of democratising regimes into the international 
liberal order does not necessarily have a transformational effect on a government’s 
approach towards violence against civilians: it may simply mean their assault on 
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civilians is sufficiently reduced to avoid external interference. clx  Thus the mode of 
illiberal peace-building may be recalibrated, but not overhauled, by international 
pressure. In Papua, containment policies were just liberal enough to be tolerable to the 
international community, while also being sufficiently oppressive to preserve state 
control.clxi Similar processes have been observed in Bosnia and Guatemala, where elites, 
‘had strong incentives to be seen as performing as liberal states,’ but without risking 
negotiated peace processes.clxii  
 
When international pressure is more interventionist, as in East Timor, it can force open 
the space for a more liberal and negotiated settlement. clxiii But this only happened in 
Indonesia in conjunction with a sufficient shift in both political and military interests to 
allow such a settlement to take place. Aside from the enduring problem of international 
legal recognition of Indonesia’s claim to Papua, the better organised transnational 
activists supporting East Timor’s cause, the cohesiveness of the multi-dimensional 
Timorese resistance movement, across its armed, clandestine and diplomatic wings, and 
the (eventually) better publicised Indonesian atrocities all played a role. All of these 
factors coalesced to push leading Western governments to pay attention to East Timor - 
something the Papuan nationalist movement still sought to achieve in 2019.clxiv  
 
From late 2000 onwards, the Indonesian government returned to the default position of 
managing the Papua conflict via “thin” illiberal peace-building methods. International 
and regional protests from Papuan leaders could be largely ignored, despite rising 
attention from a number of Pacific island states in the 2010s. clxv  As Conley-Zilkic 
comments on Indonesia’s actions in Papua, ‘they developed a sustainably violent 
governance model that is nonetheless internationally acceptable.’clxvi  
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The interaction of domestic and international factors 
By comparing the same regime’s response to two neighbouring conflicts, I have 
demonstrated the contingency of the negotiated liberal solution for East Timor. The right 
conditions had to arise at exactly the same time within both the central regime and the 
international arena for national policy to shift on East Timor. But this solution was 
permitted only if the regime then did not have to repeat this elsewhere. The liberal 
settlement for East Timor meant the scope for such settlements in Papua were greatly 
reduced, if not eliminated.clxvii  
 
Recalling Zartman’s argument that two factors are crucial for a negotiated settlement - a 
large moderate coalition within both the regime and rebel group, and a ripe moment – 
both of these applied to East Timor. A temporarily moderate leadership in the political 
and military arenas of Indonesian government managed, at the last hour, to achieve, a 
negotiated political settlement. clxviii  But, within one year, moderates within the 
Indonesian leadership had lost the political ground required for any form of negotiated 
settlement for Papua. Understanding how the external and internal power shifts 
interacted helps to explain the government’s different approach to, and constraints on, 
these two conflicts.  
 
Zartman’s approach also highlights how conflict stalemates can provide a stable and 
bearable compromise.clxix Containing conflict via stalemates is often more effective for 
regimes than negotiation or military resolution. In Papua, the Indonesian government 
was able to maintain their claim to sovereignty, and to use the ongoing conflict as a 
mobilising national issue. Negotiation under such conditions becomes a zero-sum 
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game.clxx While Papuan nationalist groups sought negotiation, which implies recognition 
of their claims, the government sought cooption or surrender. This dynamic created a 
cyclical trap, hard for both sides to break out of, and continuing as of 2019.clxxi  
 
Rather than treating national state policies as static and hegemonic, which illiberal 
peace-building theories have tended to do, it has been useful here to draw on Zartman’s 
negotiation theory, which treats conflict resolution as a dynamic process within and 
across regimes. The shifting politics of conflict management was notable in both cases, 
where policy shifted from illiberal peace-building to negotiation and then back to 
illiberal peace-building (in Papua) within two years. Drawing on negotiation theory has 
helped explain how relations change between conflict actors, and regime responses 
evolve, even when conflicts are deeply entrenched, and illiberal peace-building methods 
the default mode.  
 
Conclusion  
I have argued here that while the concept of illiberal peace-building helps explain the 
Indonesian government’s default mode for managing conflict in Papua, it does not 
explain when and why this policy shifted, whether temporarily towards Papua, or 
conclusively towards East Timor. The illiberal peace-building literature has overlooked 
the importance of internal political dynamics of the sort that made East Timor’s liberal 
and negotiated political resolution possible during democratisation. It also overlooks the 
influence international actors can have on moderate domestic factions in democratising 
states, who can enable politically negotiated settlements to regional conflicts, as well as 
the significance of formal recognition of territorial status. 
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In the two conflicts compared here, the interaction between the national and 
international arenas (Zartman’s “timing” element) played a significant role in 
determining the government’s different responses to the two conflicts. The combination 
of three factors – internal balances, external pressures, and the interaction between them 
- meant a negotiated solution became possible for one conflict, but caused a more 
nationalist political configuration for the other. As illiberal peace-building approaches 
evolve, they should account for these dynamic patterns, across both the domestic and 
international political spheres.  
 
The comparative analysis here also highlights the political costs faced by moderate 
national leaders in democratising states, when they enable externally supported liberal 
peace-building approaches. Successive moderate civilian presidents in Indonesia were 
personally responsible for these losses to the nation state, losing political capital and 
subsequent elections as a result. The prospects for resolving the ongoing Papua conflict 
in a more conciliatory way was lowered substantially as a result. International actors 
similarly lost political capital in Indonesia following intervention in East Timor. The 
political scars of East Timor’s UN-backed independence still run deep in 2019, over 
twenty years on. 
 
By comparing the results of the Papua and East Timor conflicts, several insights for 
international peace-building policy can be drawn. By encouraging a rapid negotiated 
transformation of the government’s approach to East Timor, the international 
community helped undermine the prospects of a more conciliatory approach to Papua, 
even at a time when they still had great influence over government policy following the 
Asian economic crisis. By allowing an internationally negotiated settlement for East 
 40 
Timor alone, the Indonesia military and nationalist parliamentary hardliners shored up 
political support for a more militarised approach elsewhere.clxxii  
 
If the international community had taken into account the full range of conflicts within 
Indonesia at the time of democratisation, rather than focusing only on military 
withdrawal from East Timor, other nation-wide peace-building options could have been 
negotiated. For example, the international community could have supported greatly 
increased democratic self-government and partial military withdrawal for all civil war 
affected regions. An overall approach to improving the quality of democracy and human 
rights and reducing state violence across all conflict territories might have benefitted 
more civilians. Instead, by pushing for an internationalised liberal resolution resulting in 
independence for one conflict, the chance for more conciliatory approaches in Papua 
was lost for at least a generation.  
 
These policy issues bear relevance across South-East Asia in 2019, as various 
governments continue to manage civil wars, including in Myanmar, Thailand, and the 
Philippines. clxxiii  Policymakers should reflect on how promoting international liberal 
settlements in some conflicts can upset delicate political balances against the interests of 
political solutions in others, especially when delicate sub-national negotiations are in 
play. The prospects for a negotiated political settlement in Papua remained elusive in 
2019, and the Indonesian government’s fear (real or imagined) of a return of foreign 
troops to Indonesian soil and the loss of territory, kept it so. Via working with moderates, 
while taking national interests seriously, international actors could still influence the 
Indonesian government and parliament, encouraging a less violent and coercive 
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